This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion.
I. Introduction
Economists have long believed that enhanced information about demand conditions or rival actions can play an important role in facilitating collusion, for example because it simplifies detection of chiselers (Stigler, 1964 ). An extensive theoretical literature examines the incentives for non-cooperative firms to share information through a trade association about some uncertain parameter (see Sakai (1990 and 1991) for a survey). Firms in these models may "cooperate" by sharing information in the trade association, even though most authors assume that the firms choose non-cooperative strategies in the product market. Under these conditions, Vives (1984) shows that with demand uncertainty, substitute goods and quantity competition, each firm's dominant strategy is to conceal information from its rivals. Therefore, under these conditions non-cooperative firms will not find it in their interests to form an information-sharing arrangement such as a trade association. Because non-cooperative firms should not wish to share information, Clarke (1983, page 392) concludes that "information-pooling mechanisms like trade associations can be considered prima facie evidence that firms are illegally cooperating to restrict output." However, Kirby (1988) shows that non-cooperative firms will want to share information if cost functions are sufficiently quadratic. Moreover, Hviid (1989) demonstrates that non-cooperative firms will prefer to share information if they are sufficiently risk averse.
These models typically assume that firms interact once and identify the static, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage information sharing game. This is sensible when the goal is to focus on a narrow set of non-cooperative equilibria, because the set of non-cooperative equilibria becomes very large in these models in the more complex repeated game. However, repeated interaction between competing firms seems more relevant for empirical applications, especially for providing policy insight for trade associations that permit long-term interactions among firms.
Unfortunately, empirical work in this area based on field data is challenging because the information different decision-makers possess, and the corresponding residual uncertainty they face, are typically difficult to identify. This paper uses a different empirical approach. We use a series of laboratory duopoly markets to examine the impact of demand uncertainty on sellers' output choices. Specifically, we examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. 1 Our experiment employs repeated interaction between fixed pairs of subjects, trading the ability to directly test the static models for a more realistic, policy-relevant study of outcomes in the repeated game. 2 Our results indicate the extent to which results from static theory carry over to the repeated environment, and can help guide future theory for dynamic oligopoly models of information sharing.
The experiment includes four distinct treatment conditions. In the primary treatment, sellers face uncertain demand but can eliminate uncertainty through voluntary, mutual information sharing. Three control treatments identify the reasons for voluntary information sharing and determine if it leads to more collusive outcomes. The first two control treatments eliminate sellers' information sharing opportunities. In the first control treatment sellers always remain uncertain about demand when choosing output, while in the second control treatment sellers always have perfect demand information. We refer to these control treatments respectively as Forced No Sharing and Forced Sharing throughout the paper. The third control treatment sharply reduces collusion incentives by truncating demand while still allowing 1 In a related experiment, Holcomb and Nelson (1991) study repeated experimental duopolies with and without perfect monitoring of their rival's output choices. Sessions began with written pre-play communication before each of the first five periods, and perfect monitoring of rival output choices after each of the initial 20 periods. After these first 20 periods, subjects were placed in an uncertain monitoring condition, in which it was common knowledge that there was a 50-percent probability that the reported output of their rival was randomly drawn. In this condition neither subject knew if a deviation from the collusive agreement occurs because of reporting error or because of cheating. Although a small number of sellers began cheating immediately when uncertain monitoring was introduced, the majority did not abandon the collusive agreement until the evidence that their rival was cheating became overwhelming. Thus, uncertainty made collusion unstable, but it often did not lead to an immediate breakdown. 2 Because of the multiplicity of equilibria in repeated games, one can think of our study as an exercise in "behavioral" equilibrium selection (Plott, 1989) . Cason (1994) provides a more direct test of the static information sharing models. In his study one seller of each duopoly pair faced uncertainty, and results were generally consistent with the static models.
voluntary information transmission. We refer to this control treatment as the Truncated Demand treatment.
The results, briefly stated, are as follows. First, sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information. Second, sellers who voluntarily shared information successfully restricted output below the static Nash equilibrium level in periods of high and low demand. Results were similar, however, in the Forced Sharing treatment. Third, sellers selected significantly greater output than the static Nash equilibrium in periods of low demand when information was not shared. Fourth, our analysis of the sharing decision indicates that increased rival output in previous periods modestly increases the likelihood that sellers conceal information. Fifth, information sharing was common in the Truncated Demand treatment. The second finding raises the specter that information sharing facilitates some tacit collusion, while the fourth finding suggests that some sellers employed a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Collusive incentives are minimal in the Truncated Demand treatment, however, so the fifth finding suggests that risk aversion may be the primary explanation for information sharing.
Given the likelihood that to some extent sellers shared information to eliminate risk, but that the act of sharing modestly reduced output in some demand states, the policy implications are mixed. If we take the conventional view that welfare is measured by net benefits, then the apparent collusion observed at times in the low demand state due to information sharing is welfare reducing. The welfare impact of information sharing is more ambiguous, however, if welfare is better reflected by the sum of consumer surplus and the sum of firms' expected utility of profits. The distortionary effects of output reductions are not economically large in our experiment, and output choices were similar in the primary treatment and the Forced No Sharing and Forced Sharing treatments. This suggests a more sanguine view of the desirability of trade associations. 3
II. The Model and Laboratory Environment

II.A Procedures and Experim ental Design
Subjects in our experiment played a repeated Cournot competition game against the same rival throughout the session. Profits were represented using payoff matrices that varied across periods as demand conditions varied. In each session the experiment was subjected to a random termination rule. Starting with period 30, the monitor rolled a ten-sided die. The session ended the first time the die came up as a 0 or 1. This induces a 80% continuation probability, which is equivalent to a discount rate of 0.8 beginning in period 30 (with a higher discount rate for earlier periods).
Figure 1 presents a flow chart of an information sharing period. In the information sharing sessions subjects faced two tasks each period. In task 1 they chose whether or not to share a "coin flip" signal with their rival. After the task 1 choice the subjects learned their rival's sharing decision. Both signals were revealed to both subjects only if both agreed to share information; otherwise, subjects learned only their own signal (and so were imperfectly informed about demand). Having agents choose whether or not to share information prior to observing the demand signal is standard in the information sharing literature. It also simplifies subjects' tasks because they do not need to make inferences regarding the content of signals their rival may or may not wish to share. Following the completion of task 1 subjects faced a symmetric duopoly environment with homogeneous goods and linear demand. In task 2 they made what was framed as an "integer choice" that corresponded to a quantity choice. Costs were quadratic and represented increasing returns to scale in order to enhance the expected payoff differences for the two information sharing choices, as discussed in Section II.E.
This study employs a total of 90 separate subjects (45 duopoly pairs) in 10 separate sessions summarized in Table 1 . Eighteen pairs participated in the information-sharing sessions described above. In addition, nine subject pairs participated in the Forced No Sharing treatment, Ct. 578, 1925) . A more contemporary example is the Justice Department's investigation of the airline industry for illegal price fixing through information shared in their computer reservation systems (see Cason (1995) for a discussion).
ten subject pairs participated in the Forced Sharing treatment, and eight subject pairs participated in the Truncated Demand treatment. Although the realization of demand draws varied across duopoly pairs, we employed the same sequence of demand draws across the four treatments to minimize non-behavioral variance across treatments. In the Forced No Sharing control subjects only receive information about their own coin flip before making an integer choice. In the Forced Sharing control subjects receive both coin flips before making an integer choice, so they always have complete demand information. In all other respects the treatments are identical. 4 With one exception, each session used 8 or 10 subjects. 5 Including instructions, each session lasted approximately 2 hours; subject earnings ranged from $5 to $54 with an average of about $31.
All sessions were conducted at the USC Experimental Economics Laboratory on a network of PCs. The computer recorded the data and handled the payoff accounting, but subjects also filled out detailed record sheets for each period at their computer so that they could always refer to their choices and the choices of their rival in each previous period and information state. The software implements a simple command-line interface, which sequentially prompted subjects to input their task 1 (information sharing) and task 2 (integer) choice each period. The payoff matrices for the different demand states were taped to the partitions that separated each computer. 6 The high, medium and low demand states were referred to by colors for the subjects (green, blue and red, respectively). The expected payoff tables for the uncertainty information conditions (i.e., HEADS received, no information sharing) were also 4 We assigned about twice as many pairs to the primary information sharing treatment than to the control treatments because with voluntary information sharing subjects make decisions in five possible information states, compared to the two or three possible information states in the control sessions. In the Forced No Sharing treatment subjects faced the information states "Heads/State Unknown" and "Tails/State Unknown." In the Forced Sharing treatment subjects faced the information states "High State Known," "Medium State Known" and "Low State Known." More pairs are therefore required in the sharing sessions to obtain similar statistical power across treatments. 5 Several recruited subjects failed to appear at the first Truncated Demand control treatment, which only had six subjects. We considered eight pairs sufficient for this treatment because choice variance was very low across pairs for these payoff matrices (see Figure 3 ) and our primary interest is in the comparison between information sharing frequency in this control and the primary information sharing treatment. 6 The instructions and the computer software used neutral wording such as "the person you are paired with" and "your integer choice" rather than possibly loaded terms such as "your rival," "the other seller" or "your quantity." taped to the partitions. These matrices were referred to as blue-green (for HEADS) and purple (for TAILS). Instructions are available on request.
II.B. Costs and Demand
Demand each period is linear with additive shocks,
where P is the common price received by both firms, ˜ a is a random demand intercept, β is a slope parameter and q 1 and q 2 are the quantity choices of firms 1 and 2, respectively. In our experiment the intercept ˜ a takes on high and low values (a H and a L , respectively) with probability 0.25 each, and it takes its mean value a with probability 0.5 (a H and a L are distributed symmetrically about the mean). We refer to a as medium demand. Costs are identical for the two firms and are given by
We employ increasing returns to scale (i.e., d<0 and F>0) in order to increase the expected payoff differences at the static Nash equilibrium for the different information sharing choices.
From the subjects' perspective the demand and cost structure were combined into payoff tables.
The payoff tables indicate the profit for each demand state for each pair of integers chosen by the subject pair. Table 2 provides payoff matrices for the three demand states. All payoffs are given in cents. The parameters underlying these payoffs for the model above are shown in Table 3, along with the stage game Nash equilibrium and optimal collusive choices and expected profits. The "quantity choices" of the model that range between 1 and 9 are transformed to "integer choices" between 0 and 8 for presentation to the subjects. Other asymmetric static Nash equilibria exist, such as any combination of two integers that sum to 8 in the medium state. However, all these equilibria have the same aggregate pair output. Since our econometric model uses the aggregate pair choice as the unit of observation, our empirical analysis is unaffected by the multiplicity of stage game equilibria. Table 3, for the case when subjects share information. Although these static equilibria are a small subset of a large set of equilibria in the repeated game, they can play an important role in many equilibria for the repeated game. For example, the static Nash equilibrium often serves as a credible, subgame perfect punishment in trigger strategy equilibria. We also employ these static equilibria in the empirical analysis as null hypotheses and to normalize choices in the different demand states.
Without information sharing the subjects' have two signals upon which to base their quantity choices-tails and heads. If subjects maximize expected profit given Bayesian expectations of rival quantity choices, the static Nash equilibrium quantity choices for the two signals are shown in equations (2) and (3) of Table 3 . The first term is analogous to the right side of equation (1) of (Vives, 1984) . However, if costs are sufficiently quadratic under decreasing returns to scale (i.e., large positive values of d), then non-cooperative firms will find information sharing to be profitable (Kirby, 1988) . With decreasing returns to scale, errors in production become more costly (in expected profit terms) than the cost of quantity correlation. In other words, the reduction in uncertainty is worth the increased strategy correlation occurring from information sharing.
Our objective was to provide incentives for subjects to conceal information if they behaved in accordance with the stage game non-cooperative equilibrium in order to determine if information sharing might evolve as a strategy in the repeated game. Previous work has shown that a 15 percent payoff difference was sufficient and a 10 percent difference insufficient motivation for human subjects to learn optimal actions (Arthur, 1991; Cason, 1994) . Since these payoff differences could not be obtained in our experimental design using constant returns to scale we employed increasing returns to scale (d<0 and F>0). The increasing returns to scale used in the experiment were sufficient to generate expected profit differences of approximately 15 percent at the static Nash equilibrium--i.e., expected profit of 76.5 when sharing information versus 90 when not sharing information, as shown in Table 3 .
Although information sharing reduces expected profit in this setting, it also reduces profit variance. Therefore, risk averse subjects may find information sharing to be optimal. For example, a subject with constant absolute risk aversion whose Arrow-Pratt measure exceeded 0.0071 would prefer to share information. Our Truncated Demand treatment is designed to differentiate between the incentive to reduce risk and the incentive to facilitate collusion. In this treatment, prices could not rise above P=48 in the high and medium demand states. Payoff matrices for this treatment are given in the appendix. This truncation effectively eliminated collusion opportunities in the high and medium demand states because it caused the symmetric joint profit-maximizing choice to equal the symmetric static Nash equilibrium, which remained unchanged from the primary treatment. The payoff matrix in the low demand state is the same in this treatment as the payoff matrix in the primary treatment because the low demand state provides minimal collusion opportunities; indeed, adjusting outputs from the Cournot/Nash level to the symmetric joint profit maximizing level would only raise profits by 3 cents. The Nash equilibrium quantity choices change slightly if information is concealed and subjects are risk neutral (i.e., to 8 for Heads and 0 for Tails), but only a slight amount of risk aversion leads to optimal choices of 7 for Heads and 1 for Tails as before. Therefore, we expect static, noncooperative integer choices in this treatment to be indistinguishable from choices in the primary treatment. Correspondingly, and this is the key point, information sharing cannot be motivated in the Truncated Demand treatment by a collusion-facilitating strategy. Information sharing is, however, consistent with risk aversion.
II.F. Repeated Game Equilibria
Each session of the experiment ended probabilistically, which is mathematically equivalent to the infinitely repeated game with discounting. It is well known that the set of noncooperative Nash equilibria is greatly expanded with sufficiently high discount rates, and includes many cooperative-looking outcomes (Friedman, 1983) . 8 We refer to these "cooperative" outcomes as collusive equilibria in the pursuant discussion. Theoretical models often construct these collusive equilibria with trigger strategies that threaten to punish noncollusive behavior of rival sellers. One possible strategy includes information sharing and collusive, restricted output as two components of a collusive equilibrium strategy: 9
For demand states a = a L , a , and a H , and for coin flip signals sig i = Heads or Tails Table 3 that generate payoffs which Pareto dominate the expected payoffs in the stage game equilibrium. As a benchmark, we define the symmetric joint profit maximizing output choices.
Equation (4) of Table 3 presents the optimum quantity choices if both subjects share information and collude to maximize joint profits. For the discount rate induced in our experiment, combinations of any output between those defined in equations (1) and (4) of Table 3 can be an equilibrium outcome. 10 8 Of course, the subjects know that the experiment will not last forever even if the probabilistic stopping rule never terminates the session. Samuelson (1987) shows how incomplete information about the termination period can also expand the set of non-cooperative Nash equilibria. 9 Since information concealment is the subgame perfect sharing strategy in the stage game, this punishment strategy is subgame perfect in the repeated game because it corresponds to repeated play of the stage game Nash equilibrium. Because our repeated game is non-stationary (the induced discount rate is 80% following period 30, but is larger for earlier periods), more sophisticated strategies than the trigger strategies given in the text may be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Even so, relatively simple trigger strategies are still subgame perfect, because they are incentive compatible in the phase following period 30. Phillips and Mason (1996) show that behavior in a nonstationary design similar to ours is qualitatively indistinguishable from behavior in a parallel but stationary treatment. We note also that infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium strategy may not be an optimal punishment (Abreu, 1986) . 10 Cason and Mason (1997) show that the symmetric joint profit-maximizing integer choice is always incentive compatible in the low and medium demand states for the stage game Nash equilibrium punishment strategy. Moreover, the symmetric joint profit maximizing integer choice (4,4) is incentive compatible in the high state for t<28. In the end periods of the session ( t>27), the integer pair (5, 5) is incentive compatible. Thus, like the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) study of collusion over the business cycle, in these end periods only the binding incentive constraints in good demand conditions permit slightly less intense collusion.
Note that in the candidate repeated game strategy above, the punishment phase is triggered by either non-collusive output expansion or information concealment. While one can find collusive strategies where information concealment does not necessarily trigger punishment, we focus on the repeated game strategies with information sharing for three reasons. First, the empirical results below indicate that subjects generally shared information, and that they restricted output and earned greater profit in periods with information sharing for certain demand states. Second, our analysis of the sharing decision in Section III.C suggests that a number of subjects employed information concealment immediately following higher output choices by their rival, which is consistent with the punishment phase of these repeated game strategies.
Third, both theoretical arguments (Green and Porter, 1984) and independent experimental evidence (Mason and Phillips, 1997) suggests that sellers collude less effectively when competing under conditions of incomplete payoff information, compared to complete information.
The multiplicity of collusive repeated game equilibria in this setting provides a wide range of possibilities and therefore produces a difficult coordination problem for subjects.
Previous research with more simple games (e.g., Cooper et al. (1990) and Van Huyck et al. (1990) ) demonstrates that coordination problems are difficult to overcome even when the Pareto optimal outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Most experimental studies of collusion in repeated games share this coordination difficulty, and we do not expect (or observe)
symmetric Pareto optimal equilibrium outcomes in our experiment. A more accurate characterization of behavior is that subjects are "groping" toward choices that improve their payoffs, similar in spirit to the theoretical model of Shapiro (1980) . Most subjects do not converge in any conventional sense to a specific equilibrium, so analysis of their dynamic behavior provides insight into their learning and the equilibrium selection process (Alger, 1987) .
We should emphasize, however, that these coordination difficulties are present in the primary information sharing treatment as well as our various control treatments, so the experimental design isolates any role that voluntary information sharing might play in facilitating collusion.
III. Results
We begin this section with a summary of the integer choice distributions before turning to the econometric analysis. We then use two distinct econometric approaches to evaluate the impact of information sharing on behavior.
III.A Qualitative Overview
By an overwhelming margin, subjects shared information when possible, contrary to the stage game non-cooperative equilibrium; see Section III.C below. Figure 2 presents a frequency distribution of choices over all subjects in the high and medium demand states for the full information periods in which both sellers in a pair choose to share information. [To conserve space we omit the low demand state choice distribution.] The modal outcomes in the high and medium conditions are {8, 8} and {4, 4}, respectively, but substantial variation exists across pairs and across periods. 11 The modes remain unchanged but the variance decreases somewhat for the later periods. Despite the modal total output of 16, the substantial number of choices with total output less than the static Nash prediction of 14 in the high demand state are sufficient to reduce the average choice to less than 12 (see Table 4 One interpretation is that the variance in choices in the primary treatment reflects a complex learning process, due in part to sellers' attempts to exploit collusion opportunities. As discussed above in Section II.F, sellers that attempt to collude face a complicated coordination problem, and they rarely coordinate from the beginning of the session. The econometric analysis below attempts to account for this dynamic coordination. Table 4 presents a summary of the paired integer choices and payoffs in the different demand states and treatment conditions. The table presents mean aggregate pair choice and standard errors, along with the static Nash prediction. Table 4 shows that profits were higher than the static Nash prediction for the high demand state in all but the Truncated Demand treatment but were lower than the static Nash prediction for the medium and low demand states.
The table also indicates that on average subjects restricted aggregate output in the primary treatment when they shared information, relative to all three control treatments. However, when compared to the Forced No Sharing treatment, the average impact on paired choices was not economically large except in the low demand state. 12
III.B Analysis of Aggre gate Output Choices
In this subsection we use market behavior as the relevant statistic and analyze aggregate pair integer choices. These models interpret the data set as a pooled cross-section/time-series sample, where the dependent variable is subject pairs' summed choice.
III.B.1. Models and Estimation Results
The hypotheses we investigate in this subsection are the static Nash equilibrium output predictions:
Hypothesis H1: Conditional on sharing information, aggregate pair output equals the static Nash equilibrium.
Hypothesis H2: Conditional on not sharing information, aggregate pair output equals the static Nash equilibrium.
Using the integer choice transformation presented to subjects, the aggregate predictions are (a) 14 in the high demand state, (b) 8 in the medium demand state, and (c) 2 in the low demand state, both under Hypothesis H1 (when information is shared) and under Hypothesis H2 (when information is concealed). The alternative hypotheses to H1 and H2 that correspond to tacit collusion are aggregate choices below these static Nash equilibrium predictions.
Since we are treating our data set as a pooled cross-section time-series sample, we require an equal number of observations from each pair. Correspondingly, we consider the first 30 observations on each pair. This gives us 1110 data points − 540 from the primary treatment, 270 data points from the Forced No Sharing treatment, and 300 data points from the Forced Sharing treatment. This econometric approach cannot include the Truncated Demand treatment because it employed different payoff matrices, so we defer further analysis of this control treatment until the sharing choice analysis of section III.C.
Our goal is to identify tendencies towards more cooperative behavior, and to explore the link with the sharing decision. In order to make observations comparable across the demand states, we transform pair k's aggregate period t choice, Q k (t), as follows:
where Q k NE (t) is the static Nash equilibrium joint pair output for the demand state pair k confronts in period t, and Q k JM (t) is the fully collusive, symmetric joint pair output for the demand state pair k confronts in period t. These outputs (transformed to our integer range) are shown in Table 3 . 13 This construct is larger the less cooperative is pair k; it equals zero if pair k is fully cooperative in period t, and it equals one if the pair plays the static non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Evaluation of the primary treatment is complicated by the fact that there could plausibly have been two behavioral regimes, one when information was shared and one where information was concealed. To handle this contingency, we use a switching regression model (Maddala, 1986 ). In the state where subjects have elected to share information, the model is
where
is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if pair k draws the high (respectively, medium or low) demand state, and 0 otherwise, and u k (t) is a residual capturing variations about the equilibrium. In the state where subjects have elected not to share information, the model is 14
These two formulae can be combined into the single relation
, where S(t) is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if both subjects elect to share information, and 0 otherwise. Recall that the sharing decision precedes the output choice each period. 13 Recall that there exist multiple asymmetric static Nash equilibria, but the aggregate joint pair static Nash equilibrium output is unique. Our normalization of pair choices uses the collusive strategy pair (4, 4) that is incentive compatible in the high state for t<28. The conclusions are robust to the alternative collusive strategy pair (5, 5) in the normalization. Asymmetric collusive strategies provide even more profit because of the increasing returns to scale. If one subject chooses 0 and the other subject chooses 8, 7 and 1 in the high, medium and low demand states, respectively, the expected payoff is over 130 cents. As mentioned above, two of the 18 pairs implemented this sophisticated strategy of alternating the 0 choice, despite this strategy's payoff variance of nearly 30000. Collusive integer strategies are also possible with information concealment (e.g., 0 and 4 choices in the tails and heads information states, respectively), but they involved considerably more risk and were not apparently implemented by any subjects. 14 With imperfect information, choices must be made on the basis of a noisy signal, not the exact state. We did not change the dummy variables to the two signals from the three states because at the pooled pair level (the unit of analysis) the aggregate output and profit depend on states, not signals. Moreover, which seller of the pair receives which signal is irrelevant if subjects' strategies are symmetric on average. Recall that the individual symmetric static Nash equilibrium integer choices conditional on information sharing are 7, 4 and 1 in the high, medium and low demand states; and conditional on information concealment are 7 and 1 for the heads and tails signals, respectively. Therefore, at the aggregate level the static Nash equilibrium output are respectively 14, 8 and 2 in the high, medium and low demand states irrespective of the sharing decision.
As we suggested above, there are reasons to expect a dynamic relation here if play is consistent with the use of trigger strategies (Friedman, 1983) . Similarly, any attempts at signaling a desire to collude hinge on an intertemporal connection (Shapiro, 1980) . Finally, any learning implies a connection between current and preceding choices. Taken together, these argue for including lagged values of Y k in equation (6). We also allow for systematic differences in behavior between demand states, and for differences in behavior based on the sharing decision. In this model, Hypothesis H1 translates into a test of α i =1 ( i=1, 2, 3) , and Hypothesis H2 translates into a test of β i =1 (i=1, 2, 3).
We report estimates of the parameters in equation (6) using ordinary least squares. We also estimated a variety of more elaborate models, such as allowing for heteroscedastic errors, an autocorrelated error structure, and fixed pair effects. The qualitative results are robust to these alternative specifications, so to conserve space we report only the OLS estimates. 15 The estimates are summarized in the second column of Table 5 , and are labeled as regression 1. The first column gives the parameters that are estimated, which we write as α 1p , α 2p , α 3p , c p , β 1p , β 2p , β 3p , and d p ; regression 1 corresponds to p = 1 in the subscripting. The results support three main conclusions. First, the point estimates are significantly less than one in the high demand state, whether or not information is shared. Second, the point estimate is significantly smaller than one in the low demand state if information is shared (α 31 ), but is significantly larger than one if information is concealed (β 31 ). Third, in the middle demand state, the coefficient is not distinguishable from one whether or not information is shared. To The pattern of rejection of Hypotheses H1 and H2, however, suggests that the information sharing decision has a relatively minor impact on output choices, except in the low demand state.
When information is concealed output is above (respectively, below) the static Nash equilibrium in the low (high) demand state, which suggests that compared to this equilibrium subjects adjust their output insufficiently to their noisy signal.
In the Forced Sharing and Forced No Sharing control sessions, the subjects made no voluntary sharing decision, so that equation (6) does not apply for these sessions. Equation (4) Thus, choices in the Forced No Sharing treatment and in those periods where subjects concealed information in the primary treatment tend to be too large in the low demand state and too small in the high demand state. One interpretation of this pattern is that behavior is consistent with a version of prospect theory, discussed in detail in Cason and Mason (1997) . Myagkov and Plott these points, see Fomby et al., (1988) . Because we have over 200 observations in each of the regressions, this asymptotic argument seems appropriate in our application.
(1997) also use evidence at an aggregated market level to test an "extended" version of prospect theory, and obtain findings that are consistent with their extended version.
III.B.2. Sharing Decision and Treatment Effect Hypothesis Tests
Our next three hypotheses concern the comparison of behavior under the two information sharing decisions and in the alternative designs, for each demand state. First, to identify the impact on choices in the primary treatment due to information sharing we test Hypothesis H3: In the primary treatment, there is no difference between aggregate output when information is shared and when information is concealed.
If information sharing plays a role in facilitating tacit collusion, the alternative to Hypothesis H3 is that aggregate output is lower when both subjects choose to share information. Second, the voluntary act of sharing information may affect choices, so we test Hypothesis H4: There is no difference between aggregate output in the Forced Sharing treatment and aggregate output in the primary treatment when information is shared.
If voluntary information sharing facilitates collusion, we would expect subjects to behave more cooperatively in the primary treatment when they opted to share information, than in the forced sharing control treatment (i.e., the α coefficients from the former treatment are smaller than the α coefficients from the latter treatment). Third, explicitly concealing information may affect choices, so we evaluate Hypothesis H5: There is no difference between aggregate output in the Forced No Sharing treatment and aggregate output in the primary treatment when information is concealed.
If subjects withhold information to punish defection, they would be less cooperative in the primary treatment when they chose to not reveal information, than in the Forced No Sharing control treatment (i.e., the β coefficients from the former treatment are larger than the β coefficients from the latter treatment). In each comparison, any differences could be ascribed to the ability to share or conceal information, as opposed to the true demand state or subjects' knowledge of that state. If information sharing reduces output, irrespective of the motivation, then one can infer that information sharing has an anti-competitive effect. This effect would have to be balanced against any welfare gains from sharing, for example from the reduction in risk. We therefore are interested in three comparisons for each of the three demand states. Table 6 presents the numerical difference between the unrestricted parameter estimates for each of the comparisons and the t-statistics for these differences. 16 The construct for choices we use is larger the less cooperative is behavior, so that a negative difference represents less competitive behavior in the optional sharing treatment. The first column shows a statistically significant difference between behavior with sharing and concealment only in the low demand state. Nevertheless, we reject the joint hypothesis that output when information is shared equals output when information is concealed across all demand states; the chi-squared statistic for this test is 16.70, while the 95-percent critical value is 7.81.
Result 3: Hypothesis H3 is rejected only in the low demand state.
Since the parameter difference is negative in the low demand state, we infer that behavior was less cooperative when information was concealed. In part this is because choices were somewhat more cooperative than the static Nash equilibrium when information was shared, and in part the difference is tied to the substantially more competitive choices that obtained when information was concealed. Of these two effects, the most economically important appears to be the overproduction when information was concealed.
The second column shows that behavior in the Forced Sharing treatment does not differ from behavior in the primary treatment when information was shared in any demand state. A Chi-squared test fails to reject the joint hypothesis that behavior with optional sharing is identical to behavior in the Forced Sharing treatment in all demand states (here the test statistic is 2.77).
Result 4: Hypothesis H4 is not rejected in any demand state.
The third column shows that behavior in the Forced No Sharing treatment differed from the primary treatment when information was concealed only in the low demand state. The 16 Computation of the variance of this difference is simplified by the fact that the estimates from the primary treatment are statistically independent from the estimates under either control, so that they have no covariance. For the within-treatment comparison in the leftmost column of Table 6 , we use the standard method of the variance calculation (i.e., the sum of the variances plus twice the covariance between the two coefficients). differences in the high and medium demand states are not statistically significant individually, and a Chi-squared test fails to reject the joint hypothesis that behavior with optional no sharing is identical to behavior in the Forced No Sharing treatment in all demand states (here the test statistic is 6.10).
Result 5: Hypothesis H5 is rejected only in the low demand state.
There appear to be two differences between choices in the Forced No Sharing treatment and choices in periods of the primary treatment where subjects chose to conceal information.
While subjects tend to hedge their choices towards the middle in both cases, this effect appears to be smaller in the Forced No Sharing treatment. There is also a slight tendency towards larger choices in medium demand in the primary treatment. The overall impression is that sellers are more competitive when information is concealed by choice rather than by institutional design, at least in the medium and low demand states. This suggests the possibility that voluntary information concealment may have provided an additional signal to subjects.
The differences between the voluntary and forced concealment estimates suggest that subjects have different expectations and choose different outputs following the explicit act of concealment. Perhaps complex supergame strategies included information withholding as a means of punishing defections, with effects manifest in low (and perhaps medium) demand. The high demand impact conflicts with this explanation, however. This conflict suggests a more thorough analysis of the dynamic relationship between sharing decisions and previous output choices is in order. We carry out such an investigation in the next subsection.
III.C Analysis of the Sharing Decision
Subjects earn greater expected profit in the static Nash equilibrium of the model with risk neutrality when they do not share information. The model therefore predicts Hypothesis H6: Subjects do not share information in the primary treatment.
The incentive to conceal information in the stage game is identical in the Truncated Demand treatment, so we also test The 36 subjects in the primary information sharing treatment made a total of 1204 information sharing decisions. Of these, only 89 (7.4 percent) were to not share information, leading to
Result 6: Hypothesis H6 is strongly rejected.
Information is exchanged only if both subjects chose to share information, so subjects actually share information in 522 of the 602 market periods (86.7 percent) in this primary treatment.
The Truncated Demand treatment indicates that risk aversion is the most likely explanation for this sharing behavior. The 16 subjects in this control treatment made a total of 526 information sharing decisions. Information sharing was again the most frequent choice, and only 68 of these choices (12.9 percent) were to conceal information. Although this treatment nearly doubles the rate of information concealment, closer examination of the data indicates that this difference is due to one pair in this control treatment that almost never shared information.
Consequently, a two-sample Mann-Whitney test that treats each pair as an independent observation (n=18, m=8) does not reject the null hypothesis that the two groups shared information at the same rate (U=57.5; 5-percent critical value U*=36).
Result 7: Hypothesis H7 is not rejected.
This result suggests that subjects shared information primarily to avoid the increased payoff variance arising from the imperfect demand information.
Nevertheless, the results from the previous subsection indicate that sellers succeeded in raising profits in the primary treatment when voluntary information sharing was possible in conditions of low demand. Therefore, risk avoidance may be only part of the explanation for information sharing. The remainder of this subsection explores the role of information sharing as a possible component of the collusive supergame strategies.
As discussed in Section II.F, the two-stage information sharing game studied here has a richer strategy space than the standard repeated Cournot oligopoly model. Many strategies supporting a range of collusive output levels are subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game, including strategies with punishment periods of finite length. In addition to output strategy punishments in response to deviant behavior, sellers can punish their rivals by withholding information. To the extent that agents are risk averse, as our subjects appear to be, information concealment is a natural component of the punishment strategy.
If subject behavior is consistent with any of these trigger strategies, information concealment for subject i is more likely if the previous quantity choice for the rival subject j is high. Table 7 presents a probit model that analyzes this hypothesis. The dependent variable of this model is the dichotomous decision of whether or not subject i shares information, where "1" represents information sharing and "0" represents information concealment. The explanatory variables are the rival subject j's integer choice in the previous period(s). The integer choice is normalized in a fashion analogous to equation (3) with individual quantity predictions replacing the joint pair predictions. After this normalization, the static Nash equilibrium integer choice is 1 and symmetric joint profit maximizing integer choice is 0, independent of the demand state.
Subject-specific dummy variables are included (but not reported on the table for brevity) to account for different baseline information sharing probabilities across subjects. 17 In several unreported models we included variables representing time in the sessions (with a variety of specifications) to determine if sharing rates were different early in the sessions. Time was never significant, which indicates that sharing rates do not differ simply due to subject learning. 18 17 Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis of no baseline (i.e., intercept) differences across subjects. For example, in the specification with one-period lags (model 1), we reject the hypothesis of equal intercepts across subjects at the 1 percent level (χ 2 (35)=149.1). 18 The results are similar under other alternative specifications. For example, we estimated the models also including a (normalized) profit term, which is of course correlated with the rival's integer choice. This profit variable is insignificant. We also included lagged rival sharing choices, but these also generally add an insignificant amount of Regression (1) lags the rival's choices one period only, and Regression (2) includes twoperiod lags to allow for more complex dynamic responses due to, for example, "groping" by subjects rather than only immediate and permanent responses.
The results provide some support for the interpretation of information concealment as a retaliatory or punishment strategy. The negative signs on the rival integer choice variables indicate that if the opponent chooses less cooperative output levels, then subjects are less likely to share information in subsequent periods. The significant rival integer choice lagged two periods in Regression (2) suggests that subjects' "punishment" responses are rather complex and dynamic, and not just short-term reactions to rival decisions in the immediately preceding period.
Regardless of the interpretation of these regressions, our results point to the importance of preceding choices in explaining current sharing decisions.
Result 8: There is a slight tendency for subjects to react to past increases in the rival's output by concealing information.
It is difficult to interpret the economic importance of these feedback effects using the probit model coefficient magnitudes shown in Table 7 . Inserting the estimates into the probit likelihood function, it is straightforward to show that increasing subject j's integer choice from the cooperative (normalized) choice of 0 to the non-cooperative (normalized) choice of 1 in regression (1) increases the likelihood that subject i conceals information from roughly 0.1 to 0.14. Although statistically significant, this change in concealment likelihood is certainly small economically.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The demand variance and uncertainty in this experiment provided a challenging environment for subjects. Even so, average behavior corresponded rather accurately to the static Nash equilibrium in many cases. Nevertheless, subjects were successful in restricting output and explanatory power. The results are also not sensitive to the error specification. Estimating with the logit instead of the probit model (i.e., assuming logistic rather than normally distributed errors) does not qualitatively change the results.
receiving payoffs above the static Nash equilibrium under certain conditions. Overall, output restriction was more common when subjects shared information so that they were perfectly informed about payoffs, although there was virtually no evidence of tacit collusion in the medium demand state. Sellers were most successful in restricting output in the low demand state following information sharing. While at odds with the conventional wisdom that low demand conditions hinder collusion, this result is consistent with Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) , who argue that collusion should be more effective in low demand periods. We also found that sellers were able to restrict outputs in the high demand state, particularly when they had the option to share or conceal information. The differences in outputs between the primary treatment and the control treatments were not significant in the high demand state, however.
This experimental environment has a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in the stage game under risk neutrality: information concealment followed by Bayesian-Nash Cournot competition. Subjects shared information more than 90 percent of the time, however, which is optimal if subjects are sufficiently risk averse or if they do not expect to play the static Nash equilibrium. Subjects also shared information in the vast majority of opportunities in the Truncated Demand treatment. Since sellers' ability to collude and increase profits are severely limited in this control treatment, we believe risk aversion is subjects' primary motive for sharing information. Applying laboratory results to address issues from the naturally-occurring economy should always be done with caution. With that caveat in mind, our result that information sharing is prevalent probably applies more to choices made by risk averse decision-makers, such as under-diversified managers whose compensation is tied to profits.
Antitrust authorities have traditionally been concerned that information sharing institutions, such as trade associations, might foster collusion. When challenged, trade associations have often argued that their information sharing mitigates uncertainty, which is a valuable service to the association's members. While our analysis does suggest that information sharing decisions can play a modest role in facilitating collusion in the low demand state, the welfare effect is relatively minor. Indeed, a reduction in industry output from the Cournot/Nash equilibrium level (of 4) to the joint profit maximizing level (of 2) in the low demand state reduces consumer surplus from 48 to 12 in our parameterization. By comparison, consumer surplus at the Cournot/Nash equilibrium in the medium demand state is 300, and we observed output in this medium demand state that was never statistically distinguishable from the Cournot/Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, our results suggest that subjects are primarily motivated to share information to reduce risk, since information sharing was very common in the Truncated Demand treatment where collusive possibilities were minimal. To the extent that firms are risk averse, sharing information may have important benefits. At least in the context of our experiments, these benefits would appear to be more significant than any welfare losses associated with output restrictions in phases of low demand. At the minimum, our results are unsupportive of an active antitrust stance against trade association information sharing arrangements. *Session INSHARE1 (not reported) was a 6-subject pilot session with slightly different information conditions and payoff tables. **The final period was determined randomly. Beginning after period 30, a ten-sided die was rolled after each period; a roll of 0 or 1 ended the session immediately, and a roll of 2 through 9 allowed the session to continue for at least one more period. Payoffs denoted in cents, per subject per period. Bold highlights symmetric static Nash equilibrium; Italics highlight symmetric joint profit maximum (these are not shown to subjects). Integer choices 0 through 8 correspond to quantity choices 1 through 9 for model parameters. 
Symmetric Stage Game Equilibrium Quantity Choices Without Information Sharing:
Symmetric Joint Profit-Maximizing Quantity Choices :
Parameter values: β=6, c=48, d=-3, F=12, a H =144, a =108, and a L =72 (available quantity choices 1 through 9 are transformed to "integer choices" 0 through 8 by subtracting 1) Notes: **Denotes that difference is significantly different from zero at the 1% level; *Denotes that difference is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. In this experiment you will perform two tasks in a sequence of periods. The first period will be for practice, and the remaining periods will be conducted for REAL MONEY that you will keep. Throughout the experiment, you will be paired with one of the other participants in the experiment, and you will remain paired with that same person for all periods. You will never know the identity of the person with whom you are paired.
Your first task each period is to choose whether or not you wish to share some information with the person you are paired with. Your second task each period is to make a choice from the integers 0 through 8, based on the information revealed at the completion of the first task. Your choices and the choices of the person you are paired with determine the payoffs you earn for that period. We now describe these two tasks in detail.
TASK 1: INFORMATION SHARING CHOICE
Throughout the experiment, there will be three possible "payoff tables" that determine the payoffs you receive from your choices in task 2. We will call these the "GREEN table", "BLUE Notice that BOTH people must agree to share information for any information to be shared; if only one person wants to share information, each person only receives their own coin flip. Also notice that if no information is shared, the other person faces an uncertain environment like you.
There is a one-half chance that the other person received a HEADS and a one-half chance that the other person received a TAILS, and they will make their task 2 choice based on this information.
TASK 2: INTEGER CHOICE
The three different tables determine the payoffs that you receive and payoffs that the person you are paired with receives based on the task 2 choices that the two of you make. The task 2 choice is an integer between 0 and 8. The payoffs from your choice and the choice of the other person are indicated on the payoff tables taped beside your seat. Everyone has the same payoff tables. I will now explain how they are used.
Consider the top GREEN table. The far left column indicates the 9 possible choices you A-3 can make: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8. The person you are paired with has an identical payoff table, and he or she will also choose 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8. The possible choices he or she might make are written across the top row. The numbers inside the GREEN payoff table indicate the payoffs to you for different combinations of the two choices in the GREEN payoff environment (that is, when both coin flips are HEADS).
For example, suppose the environment is GREEN and you choose 4 while the person you are paired with chooses 7. To determine your payoff, find the intersection of the row labeled with "Your Choice" equal to 4 and the column labeled with "The Other Person's Choice" equal to 7. As you can see, this row and column intersect at the profit amount of 153. This is your payoff this period in CENTS, which is $1.53. You could also put yourself in the other person's position. He or she will determine his or her payoff by finding the intersection of the row labeled 7 and the column labeled 4 (because that was your choice in this example), which is a payoff of 324 cents Notice that if the environment is BLUE instead of GREEN, payoffs are determined by the BLUE payoff table. In this case if you choose 4 and the person you are paired chooses 7 (as before), your payoff is now -27 cents while the other person's payoff is 36 cents. [Negative payoff amounts are losses that are subtracted from you current balance.] Different tables (determined by different coin flip combinations) lead to different payoffs, so you will probably want to take account of the coin flip information when you make your task 2 choice. Remember that you will only know for certain which table applies when you make your task 2 choice if both you AND the other person decide to share the coin flip information during task 1.
What if you don't find out the other person's coin flip during task 1? Well, that means that you do not know which table applies for the period, but you do know that there is a 50-50 chance of two of the payoff tables. As explained above, if you receive only your own coin flip and that flip is HEADS, then you know that there is a one-half chance that the table is GREEN and a onehalf chance that the table is BLUE. In this case you may wish to consult the "Expected" payoff table labeled BLUE-GREEN taped beside your seat to help you with your task 2 choice. The entries in this table are the average of the GREEN and BLUE payoff table entries, which indicate the payoff you could expect to receive on average for each pair of choices. Of course, after your task 2 choice is made, you will find out which table actually applies this period, so you won't receive the "expected" payoff of this table.
For example, if you receive only your own coin flip and that flip is HEADS, and both you and the other person choose 3, there is a one-half chance you will receive 228 cents (if the GREEN table applies) and a one-half chance that you will receive 84 cents (if the BLUE table applies).
Since you don't know precisely which table applies, you can expect to get the average of these two numbers, which is 156 cents. This is the entry shown in the BLUE-GREEN table. Of course, the actual amount you receive will not be 156 cents. At the end of the period the computer will tell you A-4 which table applies, and whether you receive 228 or 84 cents for the period.
Similarly, if you receive only your own coin flip and that flip is TAILS, then you know that there is a one-half chance that the table is RED and a one-half chance that the table is BLUE.
In this case you may wish to consult the "Expected" payoff table labeled PURPLE (which is the color that comes from mixing RED and BLUE!) taped beside your seat to help you with your task 2 choice. The entries in this table are the average of the RED and BLUE payoff table entries, which indicate the payoff you could expect to receive on average for each pair of choices.
PROCEDURAL DETAILS
The experiment will be conducted via computer. Each of the periods will be conducted in exactly the same manner, in the following steps: 1.
You will be asked for a "sharing choice"-that is, if you wish to share your coin flip with the person with whom you are paired. You make this choice before you receive your coin flip, entering a 1 to SHARE and 0 to NOT SHARE your coin flip.
2.
After the central computer receives everyone's sharing choices, it will tell you if the other person chose to share information with you. If BOTH you and the other person chose to share information, you will BOTH receive BOTH coin flips. The computer will remind you which environment, GREEN, BLUE or RED, the coin flips mean. If EITHER of you chose not to share information, neither of you will receive the coin flip of the other person. The computer will remind you of the "expected" payoffs based on the information contained in your own coin flip.
3.
The computer will then ask you for your task 2 choice, either 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8.
After you enter your choice the computer will ask you to confirm with a Y. If you wish to change your choice, simply enter N when the computer asks you to confirm. If you are happy with your choice, enter Y when the computer asks you to confirm. Once you have confirmed your choice, you may not change it, so be careful to double check before you confirm.
4.
At the end of each period, the computer will report back to you the choice of the person you are paired with. It will also report the other person's coin flip, the payoff table color for the period and your payoff. We will then proceed to the next period.
Although the computer will keep track of the events in the experiment, you will also keep track of everything on your PERSONAL RECORD SHEET. At various points in each period, the computer will prompt you to enter information onto your sheet.
HOW THE EXPERIMENT ENDS
We are about to begin the first period. Before we begin, it is natural for you to wonder how long the experiment will last. There will be 31 periods for certain; at the end of period 31 we will throw this ten-sided die to determine whether to continue with a 32nd period. A throw of a 0 or a 1 will cause the experiment to end, and a throw of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 will cause the A-5 experiment to continue for a 32nd period. If there is a 32nd period, then the die will be thrown again at the end of the 32nd period to determine whether the experiment will stop (with a throw of 0 or 1) or continue for period 33 (with a throw of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9) . The throw of the die will be used in this way at the end of each period to decide whether the experiment ends or continues for at least one more period. Note that the probability that we continue is 8/10=80
percent each period.
Also, before you make any decisions in this experiment, you will be given a starting balance of $5.00. Any profit earned by you in the experiment will be added to your starting balance, and any losses incurred by you will be subtracted from your starting balance. If your losses exceed $4, so that you have only $1 remaining in your current balance, you (and the person you are paired with) will be paid and excused from the experiment. If you make your decisions carefully, this is highly unlikely.
SUMMARY
1.
If BOTH you and the person you are paired with share information, you can both exactly determine the payoff table that applies for the period.
2.
If EITHER of you do not share information, NEITHER of you gets to see the coin flip of the other, so you cannot exactly determine the payoff table that applies for the period. Payoffs are given by the BLUE table if ONE flip is HEADS and ONE flip is TAILS (2/4=50 percent chance).
5.
We will conduct 31 periods for certain, and beginning after period 31 we will roll a die after each period to determine if the experiment will continue for another period. A 0 or 1 ends the experiment.
6.
The person you are paired with remains the same throughout the experiment.
Please do not talk to any other participant or look on other participant's screens during the experiment. If you ever have a question, please raise your hand and I will be happy to answer it.
Are there any questions now?
A-6
QUESTIONS ABOUT PAYOFF TABLES
The questions below are intended to make you think about the payoff tables before the experiment begins. There are no wrong answers.
(GREEN Answer .
(PURPLE TABLE) If either you or the other person don't share coin flips and you receive TAILS, then the PURPLE -147 -201 -201 -201 -201 -201 -201 -201 Notes: Payoffs denoted in cents, per subject per period. Bold highlights symmetric static Nash equilibrium (these are not shown to subjects). Integer choices 0 through 8 correspond to quantity choices 1 through 9 for model parameters.
